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MODAL RETRIBUTIVISM: A THEORY OF SANCTIONS
FOR ATTEMPTS AND OTHER CRIMINAL WRONGS
Anthony M. Dillof *
This article attempts to think systematically about what sanc-
tions are deserved for a range of criminal offenses. The offenses
considered include both consummate offenses (such as murder)
and inchoate offenses (such as attempts), as well as offenses of
negligence and crimes of passion. Unlike other theories of pu-
nishment, which tend to focus on justifications of the practice of
punishment, or the "why" question, the theory presented here fo-
cuses on the amount of punishment, that is, the "how much"
question: Specifically, "How much punishment, in terms of size
and severity, is deserved for a given criminal offense?" The ar-
ticle attempts to answer this question for a variety of crimes in a
unified, principled manner.
The article begins by considering and critiquing harm-based
retributivism. Harm-based retributivism is a leading theory of
punishment. According to it, the punishment an actor deserves
depends on the harm she is culpably responsible for causing-the
greater the harm, the greater the punishment deserved. Harm-
based retributivism has normative appeal for many and is consis-
tent with the great majority of our punishment practices.
The article then advances a novel criticism of harm-based re-
tributivism. The problem with harm-based retributivism, it is ar-
gued, is that it cannot be extended in a principled manner to in-
choate offenses, such as attempts. An alternative to harm-based
retributivism is intent-based retributivism-the theory that pu-
nishment for both consummate and inchoate offenses should be
based solely on subjective factors, such as the harm intended. In-
* Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. J.D., LL.M., Columbia
University School of Law; A.B., Harvard University. I thank Steven Winter for his helpful
comments and Maricanne Miller for her encouragement. For any wrongs herein, I of
course am solely culpable.
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tent-based retributivism, however, is inconsistent with a wide-
spread intuition that "harm matters."
In response to these criticisms, the article presents an alterna-
tive to both harm-based and intent-based retributivism. The al-
ternative theory presented is called, largely for lack of a better
name, "modal retributivism." The essence of modal retributivism
is that under it, the fact that harm results from wrongful conduct
is not relevant to the size or severity of the sanction deserved, as
it is under harm-based retributivism; rather, it is relevant to the
sanction's mode as precatory ("should be imposed") or permissive
("may be imposed").
Rather than building the case for modal retributivism from the
ground up, this article takes the existing components of retribu-
tive thought and reassembles them into a sounder structure. The
cogency of the argument against harm-based retributivism and
the appeal of modal retributivism will likely be strongest for
those who allow reason, as opposed to intuition, a leading role in
resolving moral issues.
I. HARM-BASED RETRIBUTIVISM
This part describes the basic theory of harm-based retributiv-
ism, sketches a defense of it, and shows how it might be elabo-
rated to recommend specific sanctions for specific offenses.
A. The Basics
Retributivism is a normative theory of punishment. Its basic
tenet is that people should be punished based on what they de-
serve.' Furthermore, the punishment people deserve is not a
matter of the actual or predicted consequences of imposing the
1. There is no universally accepted definition of retributivism. See, e.g., John G. Cot-
tingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979) (describing nine varieties of re-
tributivism). Some define retributivism strictly, holding that "[a] retributivist punishes
because, and only because, the offender deserves it." Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth
of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 179 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987). Others define it more loosely as the belief that "justice in punish-
ment requires the features of a punishment to be shaped by reference to the features of
the offense for which it is meted out." Hugo Adam Bedau, Concessions to Retribution in
Punishment, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 51, 53 (J.B. Cederblom & William L. Blizek
eds., 1977) (emphasis omitted).
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punishment.' As such, retributivism is a nonconsequentialist
theory of punishment.
Even though retributivists agree that punishment should be
based on desert, they disagree on the proper analysis of desert.
The prevalent view-what might be called the "received moder'-
is that the punishment an actor deserves is a function of (1) the
gravity of the wrongdoing she commits; and (2) her responsibili-
ty, or culpability, for that wrongdoing.3 Among those who hold
this view, perhaps the most fundamental point of disagreement
is whether the harmful results of an actor's wrongful conduct
should be deemed part of the wrongdoing and thus relevant to
desert. To take a well-worn example, imagine that A, intending
to kill B, shoots a gun at B's heart. Should the punishment that A
deserves depend on whether the bullet strikes and kills B as in-
tended, or misses B due to an unforeseeable gust of wind which
blows the bullet off course? Proponents of harm-based retributiv-
ism answer yes: Assuming B is struck and killed, A's wrongdoing
is properly characterized as killing (or causing the death of) B; A
is culpably responsible for that wrong. In the case of the bullet
blown off course, the wrongdoing is merely A's shooting at B.
This wrongdoing is much less grave than killing B, and so A de-
serves less punishment.4 In contrast, intent-based retributivists
hold the view that in both cases A's wrongdoing is properly cha-
racterized as his shooting to kill B; it is irrelevant whether the
2. Bedau, supra note 1, at 53.
3. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.6, at 455 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2000) (1978); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 59-63 (1974). A possi-
ble alternative view of desert is that punishment should be a function not of the wrongful
disadvantage imposed upon an individual or society, but of the unfair advantage that the
actor acquired by engaging in the prohibited conduct. E.g., WOJCIECH SADURSKI, GIVING
DESERT ITS DUE: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND LEGAL THEORY 225 (1985); GEORGE SHER, DESERT
77 (1987). Whether the wrongful disadvantage view and the unfair advantage view di-
verge in practice is debatable. See SHER, supra, at 81-82 (equating wrongdoer's degree of
benefit with his act's degree of wrongness).
4. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 27.04[B][3] (5th ed.
2009) (discussing the traditional view that criminal attempts are "lesser offense[s] than
the consummated crime[s]"). In general, harm-based retributivists defend the view that
results are relevant to desert. See R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 345 (1996); FLETCHER,
supra note 3, § 6.6, at 482-83; Leo Katz, Why the Successful Assassin Is More Wicked
Than the Unsuccessful One, 88 CAL. L. REV. 791 (2000); Michael S. Moore, The Indepen-
dent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237 (1994).
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bullet killed B or harmed no one.5 In both cases, A deserves the
same punishment.
So described, why should we be interested in harm-based re-
tributivism? I do not intend to offer a full defense of the theory
here. I seek merely to show it is prima facie of interest and plaus-
ible enough to justify the examination, critique, and revision that
follows. Let us then consider the case for interest in harm-based
retributivism.
First, there is the brute fact that there is an enormous amount
of writing on retributivism, both in the legal and philosophical li-
terature. 6 If no longer trendy, retributivism is well-established
and of continuing scholarly interest.7
Second, retributivism, in particular harm-based retributivism,
has a claim to prima facie validity. Retributivism has been criti-
cized for failing to provide a justification for the presumptively
problematic practice of inflicting suffering upon fellow communi-
ty members.' Retributivism, it is said, should explain, not simply
appeal to, the idea that the guilty deserve to suffer.' Yet not all
moral claims can be explained in terms of moral principles that
are more certain. Sometimes moral bedrock has been hit and
there are no more certain principles to which to appeal. Rather
than quixotically seeking more and more fundamental principles
5. Those who would defend forms of intent-based retributivism argue punishment
should not turn on matters of "luck," like whether a would-be victim escapes harm due to
unforeseeable forces. See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND
CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAw 171, 192 (2009); Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword:
The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 688
(1994); Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REV. 363, 379-81 (2004); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of
Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1498
(1974).
6. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 5; JOEL FEINBERG, DOING &
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY (1970); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING
BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1997); Jerry Cederblom & Cassia
Spohn, A Defense of Retributivism Against Criticisms of the Harm-for-Harm Principle, 43
CRIM. L. BULL. 920, 920-24 (2007); DJ Galligan, The Return to Retribution in Penal
Theory, in CRIME, PROOF AND PUNISHMENT 144 (1981); Herbert Morris, Persons and Pu-
nishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968).
7. See generally Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of
"Just" Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843, 845-47 (2002) (reviewing the rise of retributiv-
ism among legal scholars, philosophers, courts, and legislatures).
8. See R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punish-
ment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1, 29 (1996).
9. Id. at 29; see also Cederblom & Spohn, supra note 6, at 922 (faulting Kantian re-
tributivism in that it fails to explain why wrongdoers should be punished).
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on which to base a moral claim, moral inquiry may sensibly begin
by examining society's actual well-established moral views and
working from there. In this light, harm-based retributivism does
well. Empirical research reveals that harm-based retributivism
reflects deeply rooted popular sentiment. 0 Furthermore, the
criminal law, society's most explicit statement about the relation
between wrongdoing and punishment, largely reflects norms of
harm-based retributivism. For example, in all jurisdictions, mur-
der-the offense of unjustifiably and inexcusably taking the life
of another-is punished more harshly than consummate offenses
defined by lesser harms." As a general matter, consummate of-
fenses are punished more harshly than the corresponding at-
tempted ones.12 Although other explanations are surely possible,
our society and criminal justice system have the look and feel of
ones based on harm-based retributivism.
10. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 14-28, 181-89 (1995) (reporting empirical
studies supporting deeply held views among the community that resulting harm does
matter); Dena M. Gromet & John M. Darley, Punishment and Beyond: Achieving Justice
Through the Satisfaction of Multiple Goals, 43 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 1, 5, 12-14 (2009)
(summarizing a variety of studies purporting to show public support for retributive jus-
tice, especially for morally grave results); John H. Mansfield, Hart and Honord, Causation
in the Law-A Comment, 17 VAND. L. REV. 487, 494 (1964) (concluding that "[t]he notion
that there should be a difference in punishment [between unsuccessful attempts and con-
summate crimes] is deeply rooted in the popular conscience"); Janice Nadler & Mary R.
Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
419, 423 (2003) (discussing studies which indicate people generally base their punishment
judgments on harm-based retributivism). But see Janine Natalga Clark, The Limits of Re-
tributive Justice: Findings of an Empirical Study in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 7 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 463, 486-87 (2009) (concluding that victims of international human rights
crimes may not be as supportive of retributive justice after participating in criminal trials
of the accused).
11. The Supreme Court recently held the death penalty is an unconstitutional pu-
nishment for even an offense as serious as child rape. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S.
-, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008).
12. It has been said that "[tihe consensus of Western legal thought is to punish at-
tempts less severely than consummated offenses." FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 6.6, at 474;
see also DRESSLER, supra note 4, §§ 27.02[A], [C]; JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG &
GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW 663 (6th ed. 2008) (noting that most jurisdictions punish
attempts less than consummate offenses). The Model Penal Code is arguably the excep-
tion that proves the rule. Except for capital offenses, the Model Penal Code punishes at-
tempts at the same level as the consummate offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (1962).
Jurisdictions that have revised their penal codes in light of the Model Penal Code, howev-
er, have consistently rejected this aspect of the Code. See KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER,
supra, at 663. Furthermore, the Model Penal Code sometimes takes results into account
in determining a punishment. Reckless conduct that causes death results in a conviction
for manslaughter. Reckless conduct that is harmless results only in a conviction of reck-
less endangerment, a lesser offense. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3, with id. §
211.2. See also DUFF, supra note 4, at 117 & nn.6, 7 (discussing English and Canadian
practice of imposing higher penalties for attempts than substantive offenses).
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Third, on the merits, a strong case has been made for harm-
based retributivism. Michael Moore, for example, has presented a
well-reasoned contemporary defense of the doctrine. 3 Moore him-
self puts little stock in foundationalism-the idea that the truth
or falsity of harm-based retributivism is self-evident or that
guidance regarding the truth or falsity of harm-based retributiv-
ism can be gleaned by appeal to more abstract, more abstruse,
higher-order moral principles."1 Rather, Moore believes that a co-
herence approach in which a range of closely related moral phe-
nomena are examined is the most fruitful way to shed light on
harm-based retributivism's validity." Pursuing this approach,
Moore argues that support for harm-based retributivism is to be
found in (a) our intuitive response to cases of wrongdoing that
involve, or do not involve, harm; (b) the greater intensity of our
virtuous resentment of those who succeed in their wrongful at-
tempts; (c) the greater feelings of guilt we experience when we
succeed in causing harm compared to when we fail; (d) our for-
ward-looking desire that we not only make the best choice given
the facts available, but also that the choice turns out well; and (e)
our related understanding that insofar as we are obligated to
others, we experience the obligation as an obligation to accom-
plish, not to merely try. 16 This network of related moral feelings
about harm-based retributivism and the significance of conse-
quences, though not logically entailing, are evidence that its ap-
peal is not an anomaly, but is a highly integrated component of
our overall moral makeup. If not uncontested, harm-based retri-
butivism is then at least a vital moral theory.
B. Harm-Based Retributivism Elaborated
Much legal and philosophical scholarship has been devoted to
the topic of justifying criminal punishment. This is the "why"
question. Why do we punish for violations of the criminal law? To
this question, a range of answers, both consequentialist and non-
consequentialist, have been advanced. Relatively little, however,
13. See Moore, supra note 4.
14. Id. at 259-63.
15. Id. at 263-64.
16. Id. at 267-71. In a subsequent work, Moore defends these views against objec-
tions. MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 23-33 (2009).
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has been written on the "how much" question.17 How much should
a person who violated the criminal law be punished?
Of course, the two questions are related. There should be as
much punishment as needed to satisfy the purpose of punish-
ment. This answer, however, fails to advance the ball. It is empty
to say, as retributivists do, that criminals should be punished be-
cause they deserve to be and, in answer to the query "How
much?" to respond "As much as they deserve." If there was no
more content to retributivism than that, it would lack sufficient
substance to be evaluated. Some independent theory regarding
the nature of desert would be needed. Even a more elaborate
statement of desert, such as "a person deserves to be punished
because she is culpably responsible for harming another," would
need to be supplemented before it could offer specific sanction
recommendations which might be evaluated for soundness. If un-
able to offer such recommendations, a theory might be faulted on
practical grounds for being incomplete and otiose, and on theoret-
ical grounds for not being subject to challenge as being inconsis-
tent with moral intuition.
In contrast, consider utilitarianism. A utilitarian believes that
the right act is the one that maximizes social welfare.18 In the
context of the criminal law, utilitarianism asserts that the cor-
rect amount of punishment maximizes social welfare by produc-
ing benefits to society, such as decreased criminal activity, that
offset the loss to the offender, his family, and others due to his
punishment.19 Of course, because of empirical uncertainties, the
17. See Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From
"Why Punish?" to How Much?", 1 CRIM. L.F. 259, 259 (1990) ("The philosophical writings
have paid comparatively little attention to the criteria for distributing punishments-
particularly to the criteria for deciding how much to penalize convicted offenders"). Anto-
ny Duff, in the most sustained and sophisticated contemporary analysis of criminal at-
tempts, offers a draft attempt statute and argues that attempts should be punished less
than substantive offenses. See DUFF, supra note 4, at 352-54, 398. Duff, however, offers
little guidance as to the level at which attempts should be punished relative to substan-
tive offenses. Id. at 398-99. Likewise Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan, in their
comprehensive treatment of criminal law based on the meting out of retributive justice-
which includes an extensive discussion of sentencing considerations-fail to suggest any
absolute levels of appropriate punishment. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 5.
18. DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 2.03[A].
19. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 158, 165 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Clarendon Press 1996) (1789); Mi-
chael D. Boyles, Introduction to CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM 1, 1, 4 (Michael D. Boyles
ed., 1968). See generally Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and
Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 140-54 (2000) (offering a sophisticated
2011] 653
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
correct sanction level for any given offense may not be ascertain-
able to any degree of precision or certainty. But at least utilita-
rianism claims to be a complete theory of punishment on the
ground that, if sufficient facts were known, the answer to the
question "How much should an actor be punished?" could be had.
As a normative theory, it needs no supplementation.
It is not clear how retributivism (the theory that punishment is
justified because wrongdoers deserve to suffer) is to be supple-
mented to meet what might be called the "completeness crite-
rion." There is a general consensus spanning the harm-based re-
tributivist/intent-based retributivist divide that justice, at a
minimum, requires proportionality between the gravity of the
wrongdoing and the magnitude of the sanction; the greater the
wrongdoing, the greater the sanction.2" The proportionality prin-
ciple critically supplements the idea of desert, giving it some con-
tent. Can more be said? Proportionality implies some ratio be-
tween the amount of wrongdoing and the magnitude of the
sanction. What should the ratio be between the amount of
wrongdoing and the amount of sanction? 3:1? 1:2? 5:7? 13:11? Or
should the ratio be variable, for example, sometimes 5:7 and
sometimes 13:11, reflecting a more complicated relation between
wrongdoing and sanction? Or might all sanctions within a certain
range, say from 2:5 to 7:6 (wrongdoing to sanction), be equally
acceptable?
The most common answer given by retributivists is that the
ratio of harm to punishment in the case of intentionally caused
harms should be 1:1.21 An extreme version of this position is
known as "lex talionis." Lex talionis is a theory of punishment
with roots in the Code of Hammurabi and the Old Testament.22 It
account of Bentham's utilitarian views applied to punishments for crime).
20. DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 2.03[B][1].
21. See JEAN HAMPTON, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 127
(Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988) (noting that "retributivists typically en-
dorse the lex talionis as a punishment formula"); IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 140 (John Ladd trans., 2d ed. Hackett Pub'g Co. 1999) (1797)
("[E]veryone [should] duly receive what his actions are worth."); Ernest van den Haag,
The Death Penalty Once More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 971 (1985) (arguing that the
death penalty is a "congru[ent]" punishment to murder). In the context of developing a
theory about the upper limit of just punishment, Lawrence Crocker criticizes proportio-
nality as lacking determinacy and insists that "[tihe only acceptable position is the identi-
ty of the upper limit of the penalty with the seriousness of the offense." Lawrence Crocker,
The Upper Limit of Just Punishment, 41 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1104 (1992).
22. See 2 THE BABYLONIAN LAWS §§ 196, 197, 200, 210, 229, 230, at 77-83 (G.R. Driv-
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is often encapsulated in the phrase "[an] eye for [an] eye." 23 Ac-
cording to lex talionis, the wrong done by an actor should be vi-
sited on the actor. 24 Put somewhat less paradoxically,2 5 the sanc-
tion imposed on the wrongdoer should be the same type of
disadvantage as that suffered by the victim. Raping the rapist or
torturing the torturer, however, is usually considered unaccepta-
ble even if it does not violate the rights of the offender.26 Such
punishments plausibly degrade the person inflicting them. Ac-
cordingly, sounder versions of lex talionis allow for similarity of
sanction and wrongdoing on an abstract level that does not entail
conduct that is otherwise objectionable.2 In the case where
another is intentionally blinded, for example, the wrongdoer, ra-
ther than being blinded, might be made to suffer an equally se-
rious deprivation of stimulus (solitary confinement); or more ab-
stractly, an equally serious physical impairment (shackles or
hard labor); or, even more abstractly, an equally serious freedom
limitation of some type (lengthy prison term). 8 At whatever level
of abstraction the sanction resembles the wrongdoing, however,
there remains an equivalence at the most abstract level: severity,
or amount, of disadvantage, however instantiated.29 Borrowing
er & John C. Miles eds. & trans., 1955); Exodus 21:24-25 (New King James); see also Ge-
nesis 9:6 (New King James); Leviticus 24:19-20 (New King James); Deuteronomy 19:21
(New King James).
23. Exodus 21:24 (New King James).
24. E.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 996 (9th ed. 2009) (defining lex talionis as "[tihe
law of retaliation, under which punishment should be in kind-an eye for an eye, a tooth
for a tooth, and so on-but no more").
25. The paradox is that the wrongdoer not only harms her victim, but, critically,
wrongs her victim. But harming the wrongdoer does not wrong the wrongdoer. She de-
serves it. So, by definition, any harm visited upon her lacks the critical moral feature of
the harm she visited on another.
26. Similarity of type between harm caused and sanction is not generally practical.
As Blackstone recognized, "[t]heft cannot be punished by theft, defamation by defamation,
forgery by forgery, adultery by adultery." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *13;
see JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 148 (1990) (arguing lex talionis is flawed because it recommends pu-
nishments for offenses such as rape and bribery).
27. See Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV 25, 25, 33-37, 43-45 (1992)
(arguing that a sounder version of lex talionis only requires similarity of the essential
wrongness-making features of the offense); see also Michael Davis, Harm and Retribution,
15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 236, 238 (1986) (defining lex talionis as a principle of equal suffer-
ing, not equal types of suffering).
28. Some societies, however, adhere to a literal interpretation of lex talionis. See, e.g.,
Robert Tait, Eye for an Eye: Iranian Man Sentenced to be Blinded for Acid Attack,
GUARDIAN, Nov. 28, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/28/iran-acid-attack-
sharia-law.
29. In this respect, retributive justice tracks corrective justice-a form of justice that
2011]1 655
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from Kant, I shall refer to this idea of equal magnitude, or 1:1 ra-
tio between harm and sanction, as the principle of equality.o
I believe that harm-based retributivism, when supplemented
with the principle of equality, satisfies the completeness crite-
rion-or at least comes reasonably close. Admittedly, further
theoretical work remains. Some theory is needed regarding the
level of abstractness at which the sanction must mirror the harm.
Possibly this theory is along the lines of "as much as possible giv-
en practical limits, X, Y, and Z." Likewise, some theory is needed
to convert harm caused to years of incarceration or other sanc-
tion. Such a theory might provide that a given harm and a term
of incarceration were equivalent if the offender, the victim, or
perhaps a reasonable person, would be indifferent between
them."' Other questions still remain; for example, if A kills B,
does executing A impose a sanction equal to the harm caused, or
must A's life be shortened by the (possibly brief) amount of time
B's life was shortened? Nevertheless, because we can envision the
lines along which questions might be answered, I judge harm-
based retributivism supplemented by the equality principle to sa-
tisfy the completeness criterion.
II. A CRITIQUE OF HARM-BASED RETRIBUTIVISM
This part presents an argument against harm-based retribu-
tivism. The strength and interest of the argument is that it is an
internal criticism of harm-based retributivism. Rather than seek-
I believe we have stronger and better defined intuitions about. Where a person tortiously
injures another or destroys another's property, the ideally just response from the perspec-
tive of corrective justice would be for the actor to heal the victim's injuries or recreate the
destroyed property-to literally restore the status quo ante. Where this is impractical,
monetary compensation is regarded as fair insofar as the amount might restore the victim
to his ex ante welfare level.
30. In support of the principle of equality, Kant wrote:
What kind and what degree of punishment does public legal justice adopt as
its principle and standard? None other than the principle of equality (illu-
strated by the pointer on the scales of justice), that is, the principle of not
treating one side more favorably than the other. Accordingly, any unde-
served evil that you inflict on someone else among the people is one that you
do to yourself. If you vilify him, you vilify yourself; if you steal from him, you
steal from yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself.
KANT, supra note 21, at 138. Crocker adopts Kant's principle of equality as setting the up-
per limit of just punishment. See Crocker, supra note 21, at 1061, 1065, 1067-79 (defend-
ing "reciprocity" as setting the upper limit of punishment).




ing to dislodge the proponent of harm-based retributivism from
her position based on arguments from premises that for many
have less intuitive appeal than harm-based retributivism itself,
the criticism here attempts to show the difficulty inherent in
working through the intuitions that underlie harm-based retri-
butivism. I will show that harm-based retributivism, while per-
haps invulnerable from attack by opposing moral intuitions, may
be critiqued from what I shall describe as the vantage point of
reason.
A. Reason, Intuition, and Morality
Moral questions are neither questions of empirical science nor
mathematics. They cannot be settled by experiment or formal
proof. Furthermore, argumentation has a limited place. When it
comes to moral arguments, it is too easy to admit premises, but
deny conclusions when the alleged connection between claims is
analogy rather than logic. Rather than experiment, proof, or ar-
gument, moral decisionmaking often relies heavily on direct ap-
peal to moral intuitions. Reliance on moral intuitions is especial-
ly important when it comes to fundamental issues, such as
whether harm-or intent-based-retributivism is right. Sadly,
moral intuitions are not distinct, clearly labeled psychological
entities with special claims to truth or authority. They are just
your/my/our feelings about what is sound, decent, sensible, and
just. Such feelings are often an immediate emotional reaction to
actual or imagined situations in which the issue directly arises or
is indirectly implicated. Sometimes we can say no more than,
"Upon reflection, it feels right/wrong to me."32
Conceding the importance of moral intuitions, there is a dis-
tinct place in moral decisionmaking for reason. To return to the
question of the proper proportion between harm and punishment,
the principle that the wrongdoing and sanction should be equiva-
lent (an eye for an eye), rather than the principle that, say, the
wrongdoing should be 7/9 or 9/7 of the sanction, is supported by
32. According to Moore, "We need our emotions to know about the injustice of racial
discrimination, the unfairness of depriving another of a favorite possession, the immorali-
ty of punishing the innocent. Our emotions are our main heuristic guide to finding out
what is morally right." Moore, supra note 1, at 189; see also Moore, supra note 4, at 262
("It is also difficult to think of some more general, more basic principle with which to jus-
tify [harm-based retributivism]-'causation just matters' seem[s] to be about the only ar-
gument one can give.").
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reason rather than moral intuition. Seven-ninths or 9/7 of the
wrongdoing seems unacceptably arbitrary.33 It does not seem a
plausible candidate for a basic feature of morality. The rules of
morality should be principled and nonarbitrary. What counts as
principled and nonarbitrary is a matter of reason.
Furthermore, the appeal of the equality principle appears not
to derive merely from unmediated moral reactions or an intuitive
sense of justice. Equivalence between wrongdoing and sanction is
difficult to precisely calibrate. For example, assume that our con-
sidered and settled moral intuition is that fifteen years' incarce-
ration is appropriate for a serious instance of kidnapping. What
general moral principle does this moral intuition datum support?
Given the difficulty of establishing that fifteen years is precisely
equivalent to the harm caused by the kidnapping, this intuition
seems as consistent with the principle that the sanction should
be equivalent to 49/50 of the harm as it is with the principle that
harm and sanction should be equal. To the extent that the latter
seems a more likely true moral principle than the former, its ap-
peal is not based on a generalization from individual instances of
moral reaction (which equally well support very close but distinct
principles), but the appeal of an independent principle of reason.
The idea that reason is a faculty for discovering moral truth,
and that moral truths have a simple and elegant formulation, not
unlike the laws of nature, may strike the reader as discredited
Platonism. This article takes no position on the nature of moral
truth, whether it exists independent of the human mind, how
moral truth claims compare to truth claims about the physical
world, or other philosophical issues. Regardless of how these
enormously difficult issues are to be resolved, the fact remains
that when thinking about questions of justice, we give great defe-
rence to considerations of nonarbitrariness, just as we do in other
areas. Consider, for example, corrective justice. As retributive
justice is the norm that animates criminal law, corrective justice
is the norm that animates tort law. Under tort, if D wrongfully
causes harm to P, D is liable and P is entitled to damages. But if,
for example, D is responsible for Ps broken arm, what damages
33. Kant appears to have championed such a position when arguing that lex talionis
is the only principle that can "specify definitely the quality and the quantity of punish-
ment," as "all other principles are fluctuating and unsuited." IMMANUEL KANT, THE




does P deserve? A payment equivalent to 7/9 or 9/7 of the harm
suffered? Because pain and suffering cannot be directly trans-
lated into dollars and cents, again it makes little sense to claim
that the principle that the damages should be equivalent to the
harm is simply a generalization of visceral ideas about what is
just in specific cases, or to approach the question of the proper
amount of damage through intuitions unmediated by the general
principle that the amount of compensation should be equivalent
to the harm. This principle, as opposed to the principle that a tort
victim should receive compensation equivalent to 7/9 or 9/7 of the
harm suffered, appeals to reason and seems a candidate for a
fundamental principle of justice.
Few this side of Immanuel Kant believe that reason alone can
decide moral controversies, such as the perennial debate between
harm-based and intent-based retributivists. But the arbitrari-
ness of a moral theory can be a strong objection to that moral
theory as, for example, arbitrariness was a strong objection to the
theory that the proportion of harm to sanction should be 7:9.
Reason thus not only can supplement moral intuitions at the
margins in specific cases, it can at least sometimes, if not identify
the correct moral theory, disqualify incorrect ones.
B. The Problem of Attempts
Having hopefully laid the necessary groundwork, I now begin
the substantive part of the argument.
1. The Basic Problem
Consider the following possible objection to harm-based retri-
butivism:
According to the most plausible version of harm-based retributivism,
the amount of harm culpably caused should equal the severity of the
sanction (however magnitude of harms and sanctions should be
measured). According to harm-based retributivism, what should the
sanction be for intended harm that does not result in harm? This is
the problem of punishing attempts. Obviously, a sanction equal in
severity to the harm intended cannot be the answer since the defin-
ing feature of harm-based retributivism is that harm matters to
desert and a sanction of equal severity is what would be imposed
had the harm occurred. Alternatively, no sanction at all, though
principled, is not an intuitively acceptable position. It does not seem
right that a person who tries to cause perhaps a grievous harm
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should always go scot-free. No harm-based retributivism proponent
has espoused the position that those who attempt to cause harm but
"luckily" fail should thereby be free from all punishment. Finally,
any sanction between one equal to the harm and no sanction-for
example, a sanction equivalent to 7/9 of the harm intended-seems
unacceptably arbitrary. The punishment people deserve in the ab-
sence of caused harm seems like a basic question of morality. Yet a
2/9 "failure discount" for cases where no harm is caused simply does
not seem like a plausible candidate for a basic principle of morality.
Other discounts seem equally arbitrary." Harm-based retributivism
is stuck when it comes to punishing attempts.
How should this objection be met?
2. Some False Starts
The amount of punishment for an attempt should not be arbi-
trary. Yet any fixed ratio between the sanction for attempt and
the substantive offense seems, from a moral perspective, arbi-
trary. Accordingly, an attractive approach to fixing the level of
sanctions for attempts is varying the failure discount based on
some morally relevant feature of the attempt. The criminal jus-
tice system might then set that level of punishment for the at-
tempt based on the factor itself or-where it is too difficult to de-
termine the degree to which the factor is present-the level of
punishment for the attempt might be set based on some average
presence of the factor. Below four arguably morally relevant fea-
tures of attempts are considered.
a. Proximity to Completeness
Criminal law distinguishes between mere preparation, for
which there is not attempt liability, and perpetration, for which
there is.6 Traditionally, common law jurisdictions would subject
to attempt liability only those actors who were sufficiently close
to completing the offense they intended to commit." Proximity to
34. Some criminal codes establish that the minimum and maximum penalties for at-
tempts are 1/2 the minimum and maximum of the consummate offense. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-4-6(b) (2007). One-half is less arbitrary than 7/8, but still seems unac-
ceptably arbitrary because 1/2 is not linked to any general moral theory, nor is it a famili-
ar constant in the moral universe.
35. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 4, §§ 27.02[B], 27.06[A].




completeness is arguably morally relevant. Thus, one idea would
be for the punishment for attempt to be based on a sliding scale,
where the closer the wrongdoing to completion, the greater the
sanction. If an actor were halfway to completing an offense that
would result in harm H, she might be subject to a sanction of
HI2. The problem with this approach is that it is not clear how
such an approach might be implemented on a principled basis.
What does it mean to be halfway to completing an offense? There
seems no plausible metric available for measuring closeness to
completing an offense for moral purposes. Miles and hours seem
a wholly arbitrary measure of closeness to completion.
b. Intensity of Desire
Criminal law also requires that an actor, in order to be liable
for an attempt, intend to commit a substantive offense." It seems
clear that the moral justification for punishing a person for an at-
tempt is closely tied to the fact that the actor's conduct was in-
tended to harm another. Intent is generally bivalent: a result is
either intended or it is unintended. Yet in some contexts, it is co-
herent to speak of degrees of intent. One person may intend to
reach a goal more than another in the sense that one actor has a
stronger desire to achieve the goal than another actor. A poten-
tial theory of punishment for attempts is that the magnitude of
the sanction that an actor deserves for an attempt should be a
function of the strength of the actor's desire that the attempt suc-
ceed-the greater the strength, the greater the deserved punish-
ment. This would allow the actor's punishment to vary with the
magnitude of a morally critical feature of the attempt. It is at
least plausible that those with a greater commitment to wrong-
doing deserve greater punishment. Whatever its appeal, howev-
er, the trouble with such an approach is that it does not lead to
assigning sanctions for punishments in a nonarbitrary way. Sup-
pose A and B independently attempt to kill V and fail. Assume
that A's desire to kill V is twice B's desire in the sense that A
would invest up to $2000 to kill V and B would invest only up to
$1000. What sanctions should they receive for attempted mur-
der? Even if A should be punished twice as much as B, critically
we are given no guidance on absolute punishment level.
37. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 4, §§ 27.02[B], [D], 27.05[A].
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c. Secondary Harms
A third possible determinant of the sanction level for attempts
might be the "secondary harms" associated with the attempt. The
primary harm associated with an offense is the harm that defini-
tionally must occur for the offense to exist-for example, in the
case of murder, the death of another person. Even in cases of
failed attempts, however, society is usually harmed to some de-
gree. Sometimes a would-be victim is aware of or learns of the at-
tempt and suffers fear, anxiety, or other psychological harm.
Sometimes members of the community learn of the attempt and
suffer some sort of vicarious emotional harm or they expend re-
sources to protect themselves against similar crimes. Other times
other persons are emboldened to act in similar ways. These sorts
of harms are secondary. The harm-based retributivism proponent
might fasten onto such harms as providing both the moral basis
for punishing failed attempts and the measure of sanction as
well. 8 A nonarbitrary theory of the punishment of attempts is
that the sanction should be equal in severity to the secondary
harm caused.
The difficulty with this theory is that it is far from clear that it
justifies punishment levels at anywhere near the level that intui-
tively is thought proper. Often a failed attempt will result in no
or minimal harm to society. Furthermore, even when a secondary
harm occurs, it is usually unintended, frequently unforeseen, and
sometimes unforeseeable. Accordingly, the actor probably de-
serves substantially less punishment for causing these harms
than if the harms were intended. Thus, looking to these harms as
a basis of punishment does not seem to get the harm-based retri-
butivism proponent where she wants to go.
38. See Lawrence C. Becker, Criminal Attempt and the Theory of the Law of Crimes, 3
PHL. & PUB. AFF. 262, 271 (1974) (arguing that attempts should be punished as severely
as consummate crimes because both cause the same amount of social harm); see also
DUFF, supra note 4, at 134 (identifying the prevention of secondary harms as a justifica-
tion for attempt liability); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 218-19
(2d ed. 1960) (identifying the harm of inchoate crimes with "apprehension aroused" and




Michael Davis has developed an elaborate theory for determin-
ing the just punishment for a criminal offense." Davis's theory
focuses not on the harm done by the criminal act, as does lex ta-
lionis, but on the unfair advantage the offender secures by engag-
ing in the act.40 Davis argues that unfair advantage should be
understood by reference to a hypothetical market in which li-
censes to commit crimes were sold to the highest bidder; the price
of a license corresponds to the unfair advantage secured by a
criminal .4
Davis argues his theory yields an answer to the question of
how attempts should be punished compared to consummate of-
fenses.42 According to Davis, attempts deserve to be punished at a
significant level, yet less than consummate offenses, since li-
censes to commit attempts will bear a lower market price than
licenses to commit consummate offenses.43 Davis's desert theory,
however, is only a theory of the ordinal ranking of offenses.44
Consequently, it cannot be used to determine a general relation-
ship between the absolute severity of punishment for attempts
and consummate offenses, the issue under examination here.
Furthermore, Davis's substantive argument that licenses for
attempts will sell at a lower price than licenses for consummate
offenses is flawed because it assumes that licenses for consum-
mate offenses are also licenses for attempts and so logically have
wider applicability. In fact, many criminal codes contain provi-
sions that distinguish the requirements, and therefore the penal-
ties, for consummate offenses and attempts. 45 Based on these
39. See MICHAEL DAVIS, How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, in TO MAKE THE
PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME 69 (1992).
40. See Davis, supra note 27, at 240.
41. Michael Davis, How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 93 ETHICS 726, 742-
46 (1983).
42. Id. at 744 n.18.
43. See id.
44. Michael Davis, Criminal Desert and Unfair Advantage: What's the Connection?,
12 L. & PHIL. 133, 140 (1993).
45. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a)-(b) (2006) (distinguishing between penalties for the
consummated offense of murder of a United States national outside of the United States
from an attempt of such murder); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.92 (West 2004) (defining
attempts to exclude the successful commission of an offense). Compare VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-32 (Repl. Vol. 2009) (defining punishment for first and second degree murder), with
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provisions, attempts and consummate offenses function as non-
overlapping crimes. Essentially, attempts are unsuccessful ef-
forts to commit crimes and consummate offenses are successful
efforts. A license to engage in a consummate offense would not
provide the right to engage in an attempt any more than a li-
cense to commit burglary would provide a right to commit bri-
bery. Thus, for an offense where failure was more common than
success, a license for an attempt, being more useful, might com-
mand a higher price than a license for the consummate offense,
implying a higher penalty is deserved. Such a result, however, is
wildly out of conformity with actual practice and intuitions.
3. The Risk Response to the Basic Problem
a. The Basic Idea
One natural move open to harm-based retributivists at this
juncture is to look to the riskiness of conduct. The riskiness of
conduct might be thought to ground its wrongfulness analogously
to the way that the harmfulness of conduct may ground its
wrongfulness.46 Risk, as I shall use the term, is an epistemic con-
cept measuring the subjective likelihood that a harm will occur. 47
It is plausible to think that we have a moral duty not to engage
in conduct which we believe risks harming another, and that this
duty is violated when one engages in such conduct, even in cases
where the risk does not materialize as harm. For example, one
can imagine a hypothetical story of people contracting not to en-
gage in conduct the actor perceives as risking another's interests
for two reasons: first, such conduct often results in harm and so
is not favored; second, risk-creating conduct (as opposed to con-
duct actually resulting in harm) is conduct people can directly
control whether they are engaging in it or not. Such a hypotheti-
id. § 18.2-26 (defining punishment for attempted noncapital felonies). Likewise, many
criminal codes prohibit in cases of a completed offense conviction for attempting the of-
fense as well. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(1)(b) (1962).
46. The idea that risk imposition is analogous to harm creation has been explored by
Claire Finklestein, who defends the claim that exposure to risk is itself a harm. Claire
Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 973 (2003). According to Finklestein,
"[Algents have a legitimate interest in avoiding unwanted risks." Id. at 966.
47. Id. at 973 ("[T]he subjective, or 'epistemic,' interpretation maintains that there is
no such thing as an objective measure of probability. . . . [A]lthough an agent's degree of




Cal agreement might be thought to inform our actual moral obli-
gations.41 Acting inconsistently with such a hypothetical agree-
ment could be considered an instance of wrongdoing, perhaps not
as severe as actually causing harm, but wrongdoing nonetheless.
Once engaging in risky conduct is identified as wrongdoing, it
is but a short step to the position that the severity of the sanction
should be a function of the level of the risk and the magnitude of
the harm risked. Multiplication of the risk R by the amount of
risked harm H seems the simplest and most intuitively appealing
way of reckoning the sanction based on risk and harm. We fre-
quently multiply likelihood by payoff to assess the value of a
course of conduct, for example being indifferent between a .6
chance of a gain in welfare W and a .3 chance of a gain in 2 W49
Thus, where an actor intends to cause harm H and engages in
conduct that the actor believes has a .8 chance of success, the ac-
tor might be subjected to a sanction of magnitude .8 x H.50 Ra-
tional actors who engage in conduct to achieve some harm (an at-
tempt) believe that the conduct has some chance of success-
otherwise they would not engage in it to achieve their end. They
also believe the chance of success is less than 100% because they
know the future is always contingent and can never be predicted
with certainty. Thus, they assess the chances of their success as
greater than 0% and less than 100%. If the sanction for trying to
cause a harm H through conduct with a subjective likelihood of
success R was punished by a sanction of magnitude R x H, at-
tempts would always be punished, and would always be punished
48. Rawls's famous argument for the legitimacy of democratic institutional structures
based on their selection behind a "veil of ignorance" is an example of an appeal to hypo-
thetical agreements. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-23 (Harv. Univ. Press
rev. ed. 1999); see also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 128-29 (A.P. Martinich ed., Broad-
view Press 2005) (1651) (emphasis omitted) ("I authorize and give up my right of govern-
ing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition: that thou give up thy
right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner."); PHILIP PE'PIT,
REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 63 (1997) (arguing that the
theory of social contract is still valid, but that the absence of rebellion against a social
contract, not consent of the ruled, is the only legitimacy that such a contract has).
49. See, e.g., Nicolas Gisiger, Risk-Neutral Probabilities Explained 11 (Working Pa-
per, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1395390.
50. An analogous approach is taken by Crocker. He takes the position that an act can
be wrongful by virtue of the objective risk it imposes on society. On this assumption, he
argues that "an offense creating a risk of 1/n of concrete harm h imposes a harm of h/n,"
which sets the upper limit of the punishment that may be justly imposed on the actor.
Crocker, supra note 21, at 1084. Likewise, Alexander and Ferzan advocate discounting
expected harm by probability in this manner when calculating deserved punishment.
ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 5, at 282-83.
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less than in cases where the intended harm was actually
achieved. Although what I shall call the "harm/risk" theory of
punishment does not have the simplicity of the original harm
theory, it has the virtue of providing a relatively principled, in-
tuitively acceptable answer to the question of what the punish-
ment differential should be between wrongful acts that result in
harm and those that do not. The differential should strictly de-
pend on the riskiness of the acts that do not produce harm. It al-
so, of course, yields the result, consistent with the standard ver-
sion of harm-based retributivism, that unsuccessful attempts are
punished less than consummate offenses because R x H will be
less than H.
b. Problems with the Risk Response
Despite its ability to yield specific punishment recommenda-
tions, the harm/risk theory sketched above is unsatisfactory. One
problem appears in the following relatively specialized case.
Compare Al and A2. Al intends to kill B1, engages in conduct
that subjectively has a 100% chance of causing Bl's death, and so
causes Bl's death. A2 intends to kill B2, engages in conduct that
subjectively has a 100% chance of causing B2's death, but fails to
cause B2's death. Under the harm/risk-based theory described
above, the sanctions for Al and A2 would be the same-a sanc-
tion equivalent to H. Such a result, however, fails to reflect the
core intuition of harm-based retributivism: that results matter.
Thus harm/risk-based retributivism does not seem to be a fully
consistent elaboration of harm-based retributivism.
I do not consider the problem above to be so serious that the
harm-based retributivist must reject the harm/risk theory and be
left without a theory of punishment for attempts. First, cases
where the risk of harm is 100% are rare. It is not clear that it is
ever rational to assign a 100% chance to any future event occur-
ring. Second, cases where the risk of harm is perceived as 100%
and the harm is not realized are even rarer. In most cases where
a person is certain that something will happen, it in fact hap-
pens. Perhaps moral intuitions simply break down in such excep-
tional cases and the lack of a punishment differential between Al
and A2 can be swallowed by the harm-based retributivist as just
an isolated exception to his theory.
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There is, however, a more general problem for the harm-based
retributivist who wishes to look to risk as the basis of a prin-
cipled theory of punishment for attempts. The flaw is that the
theory cannot be consistently elaborated in a way to handle other
categories of putatively punishable acts. For example, what sanc-
tion is appropriate in cases of recklessly caused and recklessly
risked harm? A harm is recklessly caused when an actor who
does not intend to cause the harm knowingly creates a risk of the
harm and the risk is realized.51 A harm is recklessly risked when
the risk is not realized. The offense of reckless endangerment is
an example of an offense based on recklessly risked harm.52
Consider these four cases where an actor A engages in conduct
that risks causing a harm H (for example, death) to B:
Harm H No Harm
Harm H Case 1 Case 2
intended; Example: Murder Example: Attempted
R risk of H Sanction severity: H murder
Sanction severity: R x H
Harm H Case 3 Case 4
unintended; Example: Reckless Example: Reckless
R risk of H homicide endangerment
Sanction severity: ? Sanction severity: ?
The sanction in Case 1 is based on the theory of equality. The
sanction in Case 2 is based on the harm/risk theory. What should
the sanction be for Case 4? Per hypothesis, in both Case 2 and
Case 4, the same level of risk is created. The difference between
the actors in Case 2 and Case 4 is that they have a different atti-
tude toward the perceived riskiness of their conduct. The actor in
51. Model Penal Code reckless homicide and common law depraved heart killings are
examples of offenses of recklessly caused harm. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (1962).
52. See id. § 211.2.
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Case 2 desires it; the actor in Case 4 does not. Should this bear
on their punishment?
In my view, no. In Case 4, A knows of the risk of harm to B
that she creates. For example, A drives down a road at a high
rate of speed, aware that in doing so there is a risk R that a pe-
destrian will be killed, but has no desire to kill, and has no pur-
pose in creating the risk. (A would be as happy if there were no
one in the area who was endangered by his speeding.) In con-
trast, in Case 2, A purposely creates the risk to B, hoping the risk
will be realized. For example, A drives down the road at a high
rate of speed in order to create a risk that B, her enemy, who is
standing on the sidewalk, will be killed. The criminal law has
traditionally treated purpose and knowledge as functionally
equivalent states. 3 For example, engaging in conduct with know-
ledge that another's death will result and engaging in conduct
with the purpose that another's death will result are both murder
when death in fact results." Treating purpose and knowledge
equivalently is sensible because those who act with purpose and
those who act with knowledge have a very high degree of respon-
sibility toward their intended goal and known object. They both
fully accept what will occur. Furthermore, consistent with the
themes of this article, there appears no principled differential in
sanction between those who purposely cause harm H and those
who knowingly do so. If an actor who intentionally causes harm
H should suffer a sanction of H severity, what is the severity of
the harm that should be suffered by an actor who merely knows
she will cause H? (8/9) x H? (7/8) x H? I have argued that creating
risk may be considered a form of wrongdoing analogous to caus-
ing harm. If purposely causing harm H and knowingly causing
harm H are to be treated the same, then it seems to follow that
purposely engaging in risky conduct R and knowingly engaging
in risky conduct R should be treated the same. Hence Case 4, like
Case 2, calls for a sanction of R x H.55
53. See LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 5.2; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 2 (Offi-
cial Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (explaining that "the Code draws a narrow dis-
tinction between acting purposely and knowingly, [representing] one of the elements of
ambiguity in legal usage at the word 'intent"').
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 3 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
Under the Model Penal Code, engaging in conduct with the purpose of causing an unlaw-
ful result and engaging in the conduct with the belief it "will cause" a prohibited result
are both treated as attempts. Id. § 5.01(1)(a)-(b) (1962).
55. Alexander and Ferzan reach a similar conclusion in the context of developing a
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But this conclusion leads to a problem. If the actors in both
Case 2 and Case 4 deserve a sanction R x H (because they are
equally responsible for the risk they create), what should the
sanction be for Case 3, which is like Case 4, but for the occur-
rence of the risked harm?
Harm H No Harm
Harm H Case 1 Case 2
intended; Example: Murder Example: Attempted
R risk of H Sanction severity: H murder
Sanction severity: R x H
Harm H Case 3 Case 4
unintended; Example: Reckless Example: Reckless
R risk of H homicide endangerment
Sanction severity: ? Sanction severity: R x H
On one hand, the proponent of harm-based retributivism seems
committed to a greater punishment than R x H in Case 3 because
R x H is the sanction in Case 4. The harm-based retributivist be-
lieves that resultant harm is relevant to punishment. On the
other hand, a sanction equivalent to H seems counterintuitive.
Case 3 should be punished less harshly than Case 1 because in
Case 3, A's culpability with respect to the harm seems much less
than in Case 1. The Model Penal Code generally punishes reck-
less homicide less harshly than intended killing. 56 At common
law, premeditated intentional killings are treated as first degree
murder and punished more harshly than premeditated ones done
with merely the awareness of an unjustifiable risk (depraved
subjectivist theory of punishment. Alexander and Ferzan would punish equally actors
who (1) desired to cause a harm and acted in a manner creating a risk and (2) actors who
merely acted with the knowledge of recklessly creating the risk. ALEXANDER & FERZAN,
supra note 5, at 38-39.
56. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1962), with id. § 210.3. The Model Penal
Code allows a small category of reckless killings to qualify as murder when such reckless-
ness can fairly "be assimilated to purpose or knowledge." Id. § 210.2 cmt. 4 (Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1980).
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heart killings), which are treated as second degree murders.5 7 But
between R X H of Case 4 and H of Case 1, there seems to be no
principled rule for determining the appropriate sanction for Case
3.
A similar argument to the same end can be made by first con-
sidering Case 3. As argued above, it seems reasonable that if a
person, as in Case 1, intentionally causes a harm, his culpability
should be equivalent to a person who knowingly causes a harm.
In both cases, their sanction should be equivalent to H. A person
who knowingly causes harm is roughly a person who believes
there is a 100% chance harm will occur.58 Robert Nozick famously
claimed that desert equals degree of responsibility times harm (D
= r x H), where responsibility could range from 0 to 1.69 The
greater the risk created of H, the greater the responsibility for H
is realized. Assume, as might be true in Case 3, an actor believes
there is a 50% risk that the harm will occur. In that case, the ac-
tor's culpability seems half that of the person who believes the
harm has a 100% chance of occurring. As a general matter, a
sanction equivalent to R x H in Case 3 seems just.0
But what then should the sanction be for Case 4? There's the
rub. According to the harm-based retributivism proponent, the
sanction should be less than in Case 3 because of the absence of
harm. But there seems no principled way of determining a sanc-
tion less than R x H. In particular, the differential applied be-
tween Case 1 and Case 2-having the sanction depend on harm-
producing conduct rather than risk-producing conduct-is not
available to be applied to Cases 3 and 4 because the sanction in
Case 3 already turns on the risk of harm; it is not possible to shift
to risk of harm as the basis of punishment in Case 4. It might be
suggested that the sanction in Case 4 be (R x R)H on the ground
that the sanction for Case 3 should be R x H, and discounting the
57. See LAFAVE, supra note 36, §§ 14.4, 14.7.
58. "Knowledge" is often defined in the criminal law as "practical[ ] certain[ty]."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (1962). Because certainty is fairly construed as com-
plete or 100% conviction in the truth of a proposition, a person who is practically certain
believes there is roughly, but not quite, a 100% chance that the proposition is true.
59. NOZICK, supra note 3, at 60.
60. Acting with the belief that one's conduct carries a risk of harm thus may have
moral significance in two ways. First, where the conduct fails to produce harm, the belief
provides a moral basis for characterizing the conduct as a wrongdoing. Second, where the
conduct is not intended to produce harm, but does, the belief provides a basis for holding
the person responsible for the wrongdoing, now characterized as harm-causing conduct.
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sanction by R, as done in Case 2, correctly reflects the distinction
between cases of harm and no harm. Such a position, besides im-
plying the surprising identity of punishments in Cases 2 and 3,
has questionable appeal. R x H made sense for Case 2 because it
reflected the risk of harm that was intentionally imposed on B. R
x H made sense in Case 3 because it reflected a lessened respon-
sibility for an actual harm. The natural interpretation of a penal-
ty of R(R x H) would be for conduct that the actor believes has an
R likelihood of creating a risk R. Thus there would be diminished
responsibility for creating risk R. But A in Case 4 knows the risk
she is imposing, and so should take full responsibility for it. As
argued above, R x H seems the appropriate punishment for Case
4.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE TO HARM-BASED RETRIBUTIVISM
To recap: the difficulty with harm-based retributivism is that
although it seems most naturally to suggest a sanction equiva-
lent to H in cases of intentional harm (Case 1), and seems to sug-
gest a principled extension (the harm/risk theory) for the pu-
nishment of attempts (Case 2), it does not seem capable of being
elaborated in a manner in which the sanctions for unintended
realized risks and unintended unrealized risks (Case 3 and Case
4) are both nonarbitrary and respect the difference between harm
and no-harm cases in a manner paralleling the difference in
sanctions in cases where harm is intended (Cases 1 and 2). The
theory advanced below, modal retributivism, avoids this difficul-
ty while remaining faithful to the intuition underlying harm-
based retributivism that resultant harm matters to desert.
A. Positive and Negative Retributivism
Thus far I have focused on one distinction between types of re-
tributivist theories: harm-based versus intent-based retributiv-
ism. Another distinction may be drawn: positive retributivism
and negative retributivism. The positive/negative retributivism
distinction and the harm-basedlintent-based retributivism dis-
tinctions are independent. A position on one does not imply a po-
sition on the other.
According to positive retributivism, those who engage in culp-
able wrongdoing should be subjected to a sanction, the magni-
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tude of which is determined by a theory of desert.6' By this posi-
tive retributivists mean that culpable wrongdoing by an actor is a
ground, and provides a reason, for harsh treatment of the actor.
While not necessarily mandatory,6 2 punishment, where deserved,
is precatory. Different positive retributivists may have different
views on the strength and nature of the ground or reason."
In contrast, according to negative retributivism, those who en-
gage in culpable wrongdoing may be subjected to sanctions up to
a level determined by a theory of desert and no more.64 Condi-
tions for desert thus are regarded as necessary, but never suffi-
cient, grounds for punishment. The conditions establish an upper
limit of punishment. Often negative retributivism is supple-
mented by a consequentialist or other theory of punishment that
determines when a person, who may be punished pursuant to
negative retributivism, should be punished.6 1 (For purposes of il-
lustration, I shall generally assume a consequentialist supple-
ment to negative retributivism along simple utilitarian lines.)
Such an approach combines deontological and consequentialist
approaches to punishment and is sometimes called a "mixed" (or
"hybrid") theory of punishment.66 A proponent of such a mixed
theory might hold that a murderer may be executed by virtue of
his culpably causing a death, and, given this, should be executed
on the ground that doing so would maximize social utility.7 Neg-
61. See Christopher, supra note 7, at 865-66.
62. A stronger position-one that might be called superpositive retributivism-would
assert that in cases of culpable wrongdoing punishment is mandatory, and should be im-
posed no matter what the cost to society and regardless of how such punishment might
conflict with other moral norms. Such a view might require, for example, the sacrifice of
innocent lives or significant losses in social welfare necessary to ensure that those who
deserve to be punished are punished. It is doubtful that any contemporary theorist holds
such an extreme view. See infra Part IV.
63. Moore, for example, believes that moral culpability for breaking society's law es-
tablishes a (presumably defeasible) moral duty of society to punish. Moore, supra note 1,
at 182.
64. See Crocker, supra note 21, at 1060-61 (defending this position); Alan H. Gold-
man, The Paradox of Punishment, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 42, 44 (1979). See generally H.L.A.
HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
1-27 (1968) [hereinafter HART, Prolegomenon] (advocating such a position); H.L.A. HART,
Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY,
supra, at 159-85 (same).
65. See Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal Sanc-
tions, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 33-34 (1988).
66. See id. at 36; Andrew von Hirsch, Hybrid Principles in Allocating Sanctions: A
Response to Professor Robinson, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 64, 64 (1988).
67. See Cederblom & Spohn, supra note 6, at 921 (advocating such a theory); cf.
HART, Prolegomenon, supra note 64, at 3 (arguing that "a plurality of different values
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ative retributivism is thus a theory of moral forfeiture according
to which culpable wrongdoing results in a limited forfeiture of the
right not to be subject to sanctions for other reasons.
The discussion to this point has employed language implying
positive retributivism. The difficulty harm-based retributivists
have in specifying sanctions for inchoate offenses, however, apply
equally to positive and negative harm-based retributivists. Just
as positive harm-based retributivists must struggle to specify the
magnitude of sanctions that should be applied to those who have
committed inchoate offenses, so must negative harm-based retri-
butivists struggle to specify the magnitude of sanctions that may
be applied to those who have committed inchoate offenses.
B. Modal Retributivism
In a nutshell, my proposal is that when there is harm, positive
retributivism should apply, but where there is no harm, negative
retributivism should apply. Because the mode of punishment
switches from "should" to "may" based on whether there was
harm, the theory of punishment may be described as "modal re-
tributivism."68 It is summarized in the table below:
and aims . . . are relevant at different points in any morally acceptable account of pu-
nishment").
68. Theories of punishment that assert that an actor's culpability licenses sanctions
and that consequences of punishment justify sanction (but only to the point they are li-
cenced) are sometimes called "mixed theories" of punishment. Because modal retributiv-
ism asserts that culpability merely licenses sanction in some cases, but not others, modal
retributivism could be described as a partial-mixed theory of punishment.
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Modal Retributivism
Harm H No Harm
Harm H intended; Case 1 Case 2
R risk of H Example: Murder Example:
Sanction: Attempted murder
H should be imposed Sanction:
H may be imposed
Harm H Case 3 Case 4
unintended; Example: Reckless Example: Reckless
R risk of H homicide endangerment
Sanction: Sanction:
R x H should be im- R x H may be imposed
posed
The initial appeal of modal retributivism lies in the following
features: It presents a complete theory of punishment in the
sense that it prescribes the severity of sanction to be applied for
consummate and inchoate crimes alike. It distinguishes between
cases where harm is caused and where it is not. It does so in a
consistent manner, giving the presence or absence of harm the
same effect in the Case 1 and Case 2 pair as in the Case 3 and
Case 4 pair. The distinction it draws between precatory and per-
missive sanctions is not facially arbitrary in the manner that
sanctioning attempts at 7/9 the level of a consummate offense
would be.
Moving beyond the initial appeal, though, the question is
whether the precatory/permissive distinction modal retributivism
draws between cases of harm and no harm is the right distinc-
tion. As noted earlier, matters of morality are not susceptible to
demonstration by experimentation or proof. Often a valid argu-
ment for a moral position is simply a claim that it is plausible
and that there are no plausible alternatives. I have tried to show




Clearly the components of modal retributivism, considered in
isolation, are plausible. Positive retributivists would agree that
positive retributivism is appropriate in cases where harm is
caused. Negative retributivists would agree that negative retri-
butivism is appropriate in cases where harm is not caused. And
they would both agree that in cases of harm, the actor, at a min-
imum, may be sanctioned to a point equivalent to the harm im-
posed. Here the negative retributivist might explain that pu-
nishment is permissible in cases where the intended harm
occurs, as in cases where the intended harm fails to occur, be-
cause in intending harm, the actor manifests his belief that it is
acceptable to use another as a means to an end-at least to a de-
gree. Thus, the actor is not in a position to object to being used as
a means to an end by society to that degree. The actor has volun-
tarily forfeited her right not to have harsh treatment imposed on
her. In such cases, punishment is permissible and, where it ad-
vances society's ends-the deterrence of crime, for example-it is
appropriate.6 9
The critical point is whether there is a stronger case for posi-
tive retributivism in cases of intended harm than in cases where
harm was intended but did not occur. Positive retributivists be-
lieve that even in the absence of consequential benefits to society,
sanctions should be imposed. 0 At this point, different positive re-
tributivists may tell different stories to support or explain this
very basic moral intuition. For example, it may be thought that
punishment should be imposed in order to restore in some sense
the moral balance of the universe. Where a harm has been done
to an innocent victim by a culpable actor, imposing an equally
severe harm on the actor culpable for the harm restores the bal-
ance." Or, to paraphrase the Golden Rule, as you treat others, so
they will treat you. Colloquially, what goes around should come
around. A person should get a taste of his own medicine. Such a
story appears much less cogent in cases where no harm has been
caused. Consider Case A, where A intends to brutally assault a
child and does so, and Case B, where B acts on his intent to bru-
69. See Crocker, supra note 21, at 1072-79 (arguing for negative retributivism as a
consequence of the more general principal of reciprocity); Goldman, supra note 64, at 42-
47 (explaining forfeiture theory).
70. Eugene E. Dais, Commentary, Positive Retributivism and Despicable Justice, in
RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 107, 107 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992).
71. Christopher, supra note 7, at 860 ("It is morally fitting that an offender should
suffer in proportion to her desert or culpable wrongdoing.").
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tally assault a child and the child escapes unharmed. The differ-
ence in our reaction is not that we feel as strongly in the two cas-
es that B should be punished, but punished less; but, I suggest,
that we feel less strongly that B should be punished. The retribu-
tive impulse is dampened. The idea of punishment for its own
sake, the defining feature of any nonconsequentialist theory, has
a much weaker appeal.
Useful comparisons may be drawn between retributive justice
and other forms of justice. Where, and only where, an actor ac-
tually harms another does the victim deserve to be compen-
sated.7 2 Likewise, where and only where an actor has actually
created an item through his own labor does the actor deserve
possession and control of the item.73 Likewise, where and only
where an actor has actually profited through his wrongful act
does the actor deserve to forfeit his unjust enrichment. 74 With re-
spect to both corrective justice, property entitlements, and unjust
enrichment, certain consequences of conduct are necessary condi-
tions to trigger precatory claims of desert. Punishment for in-
choate offenses, where conduct need not have morally relevant
consequences, seems an odd candidate for precatory punishment.
In my view, it is the weak sister in the family of conditions to be
treated according to justice. In order to be supplemented it needs
some tie to effects in the real world. That tie, however, is not the
effects of past conduct, but to the future socially beneficial effects
of punishment. Without these beneficial effects, punishment is
not precatory. Rather, punishment is only permitted on the con-
dition that such beneficial effects will occur. This is exactly the
theory of modal retributivism.
C. Modal Retributivism and Plato
To my knowledge, no theorist of punishment has taken a posi-
tion which strictly instantiates modal retributivism. However,
modal retributivism is not so far from existing theories as to
make it outlandish. A theory of punishment along the lines of
72. See VIVIENNE HARPWOOD, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 1-3 (4th ed. 2000).
73. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288-89 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
74. See Andrew Kull, Restitution's Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 17, 18 (2003) (ex-
plaining that restitution is intended to strip the actor of any profit he has gained as a re-
sult of his wrongful conduct).
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modal retributivism can be found, for example, in Plato's discus-
sion of criminal punishment, as elaborated by Peter Westen.6
Plato's views on punishment are not deeply theorized by Plato
himself. Rather they must be inferred from the penalties he re-
commends and his brief attendant comments. First, the penalties
he recommends are in line with those recommended by modal re-
tributivism. Plato believes those who kill intentionally and un-
lawfully should be put to death.76 This is consistent with the
equality (lex talionis) component of modal retributivism. Regard-
ing the question whether those who try to kill, and do not, should
be put to death, Plato's answer is: they may, it depends." Accord-
ing to Plato, whether they should be turns on the relationship of
the would-be killer and the intended victim.78 While in the gener-
al case execution is inappropriate, in cases of patricide and the
killing of a master by a slave, execution is appropriate.79 Thus,
Plato's penalty recommendations may be characterized as preca-
tory when there is resultant harm, and permissive (depending on
the status of the parties) in cases of attempt. Plato's theory thus
tracks modal retributivism.
Second, the rationale behind these recommendations seems a
form of modal retributivism. Why, Westen asks, does Plato make
these distinctions, first between those who cause harm and those
who do not, and second among those who do not?o According to
Plato, the difference in treatment between killers and attempted
killers is due to the fact that the sparing of the life of the latter is
a "thank-offering" to the deity responsible for the fact no death
occurred." Westen interprets Plato as saying that where an at-
tempt to harm is unsuccessful, society should feel gratefulness
and only a muted indignation, and that in this light, a reduced
punishment is appropriate. 2 Stated conversely, it is the indigna-
75. Peter Westen, Why Criminal Harms Matter: Plato's Abiding Insight in the Laws,
1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 307, 315-18 (2007).
76. Plato, Laws, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, INCLUDING THE LETTERS,
1225, 1432 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., A.E. Taylor trans., Bollingen
Found. 1961).
77. Id. at 1435-36.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Westen, supra note 75, at 315-16.
81. Plato, Laws, in 5 THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 261-62 (B. Jowett ed.,
Macmillan and Co. 1892).
82. See Westen, supra note 75, at 318.
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tion that society rightly feels when death occurs, along with the
offender's personal culpability, that properly motivates society's
extracting full punishment. Westen is explicit that in Plato's
view, the fact of harm is not related to the desert of the offender,8 3
as it would be pursuant to strict modal retributivism. Neverthe-
less, the critical fact is that harm justifies punishment for non-
consequentialist reasons as in modal retributivism.
In contrast, where there is no death, the status relationship of
the parties matters. In the absence of an explanation by Plato,
Westen theorizes that where the attempt to kill fails, the actor
should be executed either because (1) the act is so heinous that
even when the mitigation based on gratitude for survival is taken
into account, execution is appropriate; or (2) patricide and
slave/master murder are so socially destructive that society's in-
terest in deterrence overrides "the value of the supererogatory
act of remitting the death penalty in the event of failure.""8 It is
this second explanation that interests me. If it is correct, then the
significance of death, or harm more generally, is that when it is
culpably caused, no further justification is needed; in contrast,
where harm is absent, society has no intrinsic reason to act, and
consequentialist considerations come into play to determine the
level of punishment. This is the defining feature of modal retri-
butivism: where there is harm, nonconsequential considerations
justify full punishment; where there is no harm, consequential
and deontological ones jointly determine the level of punishment.
D. Modal Retributivism Elaborated
The previous sections discussed the operation of modal retribu-
tivism in the context of three types of mentes reae: purpose,
knowledge, and risk awareness. The underlying thesis was that
it made sense and was possible to produce a deontological theory
that, with the appropriate empirical inputs, such as the magni-
tude of harm and level of subjective risk, prescribed precise pu-
nishments across a range of offenses. This section shows how this






1. Crimes of Passion
Voluntary manslaughter is a crime of passion.85 Loosely speak-
ing, a person commits voluntary manslaughter when she kills
another in a sudden state of emotional turmoil in response to
adequate provocation.86 The penalty for voluntary manslaughter
is less than that for murder, but generally equal to or greater
than the penalty for involuntary manslaughter. 7 What should
the penalty be for voluntary manslaughter, consistent with the
goal of this article to develop a theory of nonarbitrary sanction
recommendations? In particular, how should the sanction level
compare with the penalty for murder?
Before answering this question, it should be noted that volun-
tary manslaughter is unique in providing a mitigated sanction
for an intentional wrongful act taken in the heat of passion.88 If
an attack results in severe permanent injury, but not death of a
victim, the fact that it was committed in the heat of passion is ir-
relevant to the determination of the sanction range the offender
may be exposed to. 9 There seems no principled reason why heat
of passion should be relevant in one case, but not the other. The
criminal law thus seems internally conflicted regarding whether
acting in the heat of passion should be a mitigating factor, at
least at the level of offense definition. Almost all commentators,
however, endorse mitigation for homicide,90 and so I shall offer an
approach to determining the sanction for manslaughter. The ap-
proach, in theory, could be extended to other offenses committed
in the heat of passion.
There is ongoing controversy whether the penalty discount for
manslaughter relative to murder is better understood as a partial
justification based on the wrongfulness of the provoking event or
a partial excuse based on justified emotional turmoil.'9 Justifica-
85. LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 15.2.
86. Id.
87. See id. § 15.1
88. See id. § 15.2(h).
89. See id.
90. An exception is Cynthia Lee, who advocates the doctrine's repeal. See CYNTHIA
LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN (2003).
91. See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1339-40 (1997) (discussing the Model Penal Code's emphasis
on provocation as a partial excuse based on the defendant's emotional disturbance, rather
than a partial justification based on the provocation by the victim); see also Kyron Hui-
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tion defenses are appropriate in cases where the wrongdoing is
either annulled or offset by the existence of justifying circums-
tances. If H is the harm done in a killing, what is the harm done
in a case of voluntary manslaughter when some of the wrong-
doing is either annulled or offset by the partially justifying cir-
cumstances of provocation? (2/3)11 (3/4)H? Excuse defenses are
appropriate in cases where responsibility for a wrongdoing is di-
minished. According to the equality principle, in the typical case
an actor is maximally responsible where she intended the harm
or knew the harm would be caused. Where an actor merely risks
causing a harm, her responsibility for the harm is less. I have ar-
gued that in such cases, the sanction should reflect this lesser re-
sponsibility by being R x H, where R is less than 1. What diminu-
tion in responsibility does acting in the heat of passion entail?
(2/3)11? (3/4)11? Neither a justification approach nor an excuse
approach appears to offer a framework for deciding the amount of
the discount for killing in the heat of passion.
Without attempting to characterize my approach as either jus-
tification based or excuse based, let me offer the following
thoughts on voluntary manslaughter. When one kills another in
the heat of passion, one knows that one is killing another person.
Neither intense fear, anger, nor jealousy interferes appreciably
with an actor's cognitive faculties. Instead, intense fear, anger,
jealousy, and the like interfere with an actor's emotional facul-
ties. Though she knows that the provoker she is killing is human,
the killer acting in the heat of passion does not feel the signific-
ance of this. The revulsion, incipient sorrow, guilt, and moral
gravity associated with the prospect of killing another is obscured
by the overwhelming feelings of fear, anger, or jealousy the actor
experiences. Potential empathy for the victim is suppressed. Kill-
ing when provoked does not feel like the killing of another. On
the emotional level, it feels as if one is committing a much less
harmful act. Of course, in order for the actor to get the benefit of
the manslaughter discount, this distorted feeling must be rea-
sonable under the circumstances. The actor cannot be blamed for
her failure to feel as she should. In such circumstances, the sanc-
tion that should be imposed on the actor should be equal in mag-
nitude to the harm she (reasonably) feels she is causing, or, in
gens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 97, 132-45 (2002) (advocating an
abolishment of "provocation" excuse because it is "pernicious and unnecessary").
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other words, equal in magnitude to the harm of the type that a
reasonable person in her position would feel like she is causing.
This will vary based on the intensity of the passion that the actor
appropriately felt. Thus, the theoretically ideal sanction for man-
slaughter would be a sliding scale based on the evaluation of a
counterfactual proposition about the degree of wrongfulness a
reasonable person would feel.92
The question then arises: to what extent is the reasonable per-
son prone to having her normal moral perceptions of the value of
others obscured by emotions like fear and anger? Anger and fear
sometimes serve a valuable purpose. When we are attacked, for
example, anger can free us from the squeamishness and second
thoughts that might otherwise interfere with our own self-
defense. Similarly, fear promotes justified risk avoidance by act-
ing as a counterweight to greed, gratification, and the tendency
to discount future harms. Furthermore, living a life that fosters
emotional control-for example, the life of a Buddhist monk or a
strict military career-at least risks an unhealthy detachment
from the richness of life or a limited emotional capacity for empa-
thy and expression. It has been theorized that reasonable persons
take risks to the extent the risks maximize social welfare.9
Likewise, it may be argued reasonable persons develop the capac-
ity for emotions like fear and anger to the extent those emotions
maximize social well-being, however conceived. Although this
amount cannot practically be determined with any higher degree
of accuracy than the reasonable level of risk taking, it is theoreti-
cally specifiable given sufficient empirical information and, once
specified, implies-as argued above-a principled punishment
level for voluntary manslaughter.
2. Crimes of Negligence
Finally, it may be asked where offenses of negligence, such as
negligent homicide or battery, fit into modal retributivism.94
92. A similar approach of understanding crimes of passion as involving undiminished
culpability for lesser harms, rather than diminished culpability for full harms, is taken by
Cederblom and Spohn. Cederblom & Spohn, supra note 6, at 925-26.
93. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 6.1-6.2 (7th ed. 2007).
94. Criminal offenses of negligence usually require a higher level of negligence than
simple or civil negligence, sometimes referred to as "criminal" or "gross" negligence. Re-
gardless of degree, the defining feature of criminal negligence offenses is that they do not
require awareness of the unacceptable risk created, as do offenses of recklessness. See,
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When it comes to the criminal law, this question is not directly
applicable. The central thesis of modal retributivism is that cases
where harm is caused should be punished and cases where there
is no harm may be punished. Currently, there are no offenses of
negligent conduct that do not result in harm.95 Thus, strictly
speaking, the application of modal retributivism to offenses of
negligence does not arise.
Nevertheless it may be asked, according to the general ap-
proach this article has followed to issues of punishment: what is
the appropriate punishment for acts of negligence that cause
harm? This article has argued that the sanction for recklessly
caused harms should be R x H, where R is the subjective risk of
harm and H is the magnitude of harm. It is universally agreed
among commentators that negligence is a lesser form of culpabil-
ity than recklessness, and that therefore acts of negligence that
result in a given harm deserve less severe sanctions than reck-
less acts causing equivalent harms.9 6 So if negligence deserves to
be punished, some principled amount of punishment between 0
and R x H needs to be found.
With respect to manslaughter, there was widespread agree-
ment that killings due to the reasonably inflamed passions of the
actor should be punished, though at a lesser level than cold-
blooded or inadequately provoked killings. In contrast, there is
substantial debate whether those who negligently cause harm
should be subjected to criminal sanctions at all." Some take the
position that there should be no criminal offenses based on negli-
e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (1962).
95. It is an interesting question why a person who engages in negligent conduct, but
luckily fails to cause harm, should escape criminal liability while a person who negligent-
ly causes harm, such as death, may be subjected to significant criminal penalties. This is
true even in the Model Penal Code, which generally established the same level of pu-
nishment for consummate offenses and attempts. See id. § 5.05(1).
96. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 5.4. In contrast, the common law provides
some support for the proposition that negligence should be punished equally with intent
and recklessness. Under the common law, various defenses, such as self-defense and ne-
cessity, are not available if the actor negligently believed the conditions for the defense
existed. For example, an actor could not claim self-defense if she negligently believed the
victim was threatening her. See DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 18.01[E], at 225. The actor
would be liable as much if he had been reckless with respect to, or had known of, the ab-
sence of these conditions. The Model Penal Code rejects this approach and treats negli-
gence regarding defense conditions like negligence regarding offense conditions-lesser
liability compared to recklessness and knowledge results. See MODEL PENAL CODE H
3.02(2), 3.09(2).
97. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 10.04[D][2][c].
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gence." They argue that the moral culpability associated with
negligence is not great enough to warrant criminal sanctions." As
a normative matter, the argument is that there is an important
moral distinction between being lazy, careless, unthinking, or un-
intelligent, and being evil.o10 As a descriptive matter, they might
point to the fact that there are no criminal offenses of negligent
harm to property and that frequently there are no offenses based
on the negligent causing of nonfatal injuries. Given that moral
intuition supports a lesser sanction for negligently caused harm,
and that there is reasonable disagreement whether negligently
caused harm should be punished at some level less than R x H or
not at all, I advocate the latter position. The reason is that there
seems to be no principled basis for determining the amount of a
sanction that lies between R x H and 0. There appears to be nei-
ther an attractive fixed point, such as R x (H/2), nor a relevant
factor that might establish a sliding scale for a criminal sanction.
Until a theory is advanced,"o' it seems to make more sense to
adopt the position that tort liability for negligently caused harms
satisfies the demands of justice. Here, for once, zero punishment
seems the appropriate principled criminal sanction.
IV. IMPLEMENTING MODAL RETRIBUTIVISM
Assuming modal retributivism and the other sanction schemes
recommended herein are found appealing, various changes in ex-
isting law would have to be made to implement them. Four such
changes are described below.
First, the most obvious change would be to equalize the maxi-
mum penalties for consummate offenses and attempts. Current
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 5, at 71 ("[A]cts of clumsiness and
stupidity hardly seem to be the sort of things for which we wish to hold people criminally
liable. . . ."); Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded From Penal Liability,
63 CoLuM. L. REv. 632 (1963).
100. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 5, at 70-71.
101. Perhaps a theory may be advanced along the following lines: Sometimes persons
unreasonably fail to perceive that their conduct creates an unjustifiable risk of harm
when there is strong evidence for finding an unjustifiable risk; others do so where there is
weaker but still sufficient evidence. The former are arguably more negligent and more
culpable. Perhaps there is a means of calibrating the unreasonableness of failing to perce-
ive the risk by assessing the strength of the evidence for the risk and, on this basis, de-
termining, along with the magnitude of the risk and the amount of harm, the appropriate
level of sanction.
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law establishes lesser sanctions for attempts. Under modal retri-
butivism, a sanction of H or R x H (for offenses of recklessness)
may be imposed even in the absence of harm, depending on
whether there is an independent consequentialist justification for
the sanction. Assuming that appropriate sanction levels are al-
ready in place for consummate offenses, the maximum penalty
levels for attempts would have to be raised to those levels.
Implementing such a change directly might not be possible for
attempted murder. Although it has never squarely considered the
question, it is likely that the Supreme Court would hold that ex-
ecuting an actor for attempted murder would violate the consti-
tutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 10 2 Thus,
under current law, an actor who luckily fails to kill his intended
victim may not be executed, and another actor who does kill his
intended victim would be executed, though both (1) demonstrate
through their conduct an utter disregard for the sanctity of life
and (2) present a relatively high probability of killing an innocent
person in the future unless executed. Given this constitutional
constraint, modal retributivism might recommend as a possible
maximum sentence for attempted murder a sanction like life im-
prisonment in solitary confinement. Such a sanction is arguably
as harsh as the death penalty.'
Second, minimum penalties for attempts should be lowered to
a de minimis amount to allow for cases where there is no inde-
pendent consequentialist reason to impose a sanction. According
to modal retributivism, where an actor has recklessly engaged in
conduct or has tried to cause harm, yet no harm has ensued, pu-
nishment is merely contingently licensed. In some cases, for ex-
ample where the actor demonstrates no likelihood of recidivism
102. The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the scope of the death penal-
ty can be found in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). In Kennedy,
the Court held that the Constitution forbids execution for child rape. Id. at _, 128 S. Ct.
at 2646. The Court stated therein, "[Olur holding is that a death sentence for one who
raped but did not kill a child, and who did not intend to assist another in killing the child,
is unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at -, 128 S. Ct.
2650-51. This statement seems ambiguous. It might be read to recognize the constitu-
tional possibility of capital punishment in either cases of (a) child rape where there was
an intent to assist in a murder that did not occur, or (b) child rape-plus-murder-by-
another where there was an intent to assist in the murder. Under the first interpretation
at least sometimes capital punishment for attempted murder would be constitutional; un-
der the second interpretation, not. Either interpretation, of course, is dictum at best.
103. See David McCord, Imagining a Retributivist Alternative to Capital Punishment,
50 FLA. L. REv. 1, 104-09 (1998).
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and punishment will not deter, there will be no independent rea-
son to impose a sanction. Likewise, there may be cases where
relatively weak gains in deterrence and other benefits are offset
by significant social costs of incarceration. Here no sanction is
appropriate. Of course, in many cases of criminal attempts, there
will be some harm, such as anxiety and apprehension, caused to
the intended victim or to the community. In those cases, some
punishment would be called for, at least to the extent the harm
was foreseen. Some de minimis punishment would likely be war-
ranted.
By the same token, many offenses that have significant in-
choate aspects should have minimum penalties lowered to a de
minimis level. By "offenses that have significant inchoate as-
pects," I refer to offenses with maximum penalty levels that can-
not be justified in harm-based retributivism terms by appealing
to harms required by the offense's definition. An example of such
an offense is larceny. In common law-based jurisdictions, larceny
is frequently defined as "the trespassory taking and carrying
away of the personal property of another with the intent to per-
manently deprive the possessor of the property."14 If the property
is worth over $500, the minimum penalty for theft is a year in-
carceration.10 An actor can commit a larceny by causing only mi-
nor interference with the use of an item.10 6 Removing an item on-
ly for a minute or a meter satisfies the requirements of larceny.
Causing such a fleeting harm could not in itself justify imposing
a sanction of a year in jail. Rather than an offense of harm caus-
ing, larceny is better thought of as a specific type of criminal at-
tempt-attempting to deprive a person permanently of proper-
ty.o'0 Thus, it should have a penalty range similar to an attempt:
from a de minimis penalty to a penalty equivalent to the harm
associated with cases where a permanent deprivation was in fact
accomplished. Perjury is another crime defined in the inchoate
mode. The harm that it seeks to prevent is erroneous verdicts,
but perjury may be committed even if the perjury is not believed
by the decisionmaker, or even if it does not contribute to an erro-
neous verdict. 08 A similar analysis would apply to many other of-
104. DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 32.02[A].
105. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2)(a) (1962).
106. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 4, § 32.05.
107. See DUFF, supra note 4, at 128-29 (discussing implicit inchoate offenses).
108. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(2) (defining the material false statement required
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fenses, including burglary and most possessory offenses. Other
offenses with significant inchoate aspects, such as rape, 09 should
also have minimum penalties lowered.
Third, the negligent causing of death should be treated like the
negligent causing of injury and the negligent causing of property
damage."0 There should be no criminal penalty; rather, liability
should be civil only.
Fourth, nonbinding guidelines should be legislatively promul-
gated. Thus far this discussion has assumed the standard offense
definitions and has advocated a range of sanctions wide enough
to accommodate those cases satisfying the offense definition. In
theory, the offenses themselves could be defined in a manner to
more closely track the sanction recommendations of modal retri-
butivism. For example, a hypothetical offense of "first degree at-
tempted arson" might be defined as "attempted arson by an actor
whose lengthy incarceration would produce a net benefit for so-
ciety" and carry a penalty equal to that of arson. The difficulty
with such an approach, of course, is that jurors are not well posi-
tioned to determine whether consequentialist-related conditions
such as being "an actor whose lengthy incarceration would bene-
fit society" are present. Jurors do not have the training or expe-
rience to make competent cost-benefit determinations.
The alternative that establishes a wide sentencing range of at-
tempt sanctions for judges to choose from, however, cannot be le-
gislatively supplemented to ensure that judges will act consis-
tently with modal retributivism. Recent Supreme Court case law
bars legislatures from establishing sentencing guidelines that set
conditions that a judge must find in order to impose an enlarged
for perjury as one that "could have affected the course or outcome of the proceeding" (em-
phasis added)).
109. The physical injuries caused by rape are often less severe than in cases of aggra-
vated assault. The very high penalties for rape are thus best justified in retributivist
terms by the severe emotional and psychological harm that typically result from rape.
These emotional and psychological harms, however, are not a required element of rape.
Under modal retributivism, in the atypical case where such harm, even though culpably
risked, does not occur, punishment should not exceed an amount equal to the actual phys-
ical harm.
110. The Model Penal Code creates no liability for negligent physical injury (unless
done with a deadly weapon) or property damage. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(b)
(1962). Under the common law, there generally was no criminal liability for negligent
property damage, and no clearly established criminal liability for negligently caused phys-
ical injury. LAFAVE, supra note 36, §§ 16.2(c)(2).
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sanction."' A judge, for example, cannot be instructed by the leg-
islature to only impose the maximum sentence where there is a
consequentialist justification to do so; the judge must be given
discretion to impose it on the ground (contrary to modal retribu-
tivism) that the actor's purpose was evil. For this reason, the
negative retributivist side of modal retributivism, which asserts
that evil purpose is not a reason to impose punishment, is diffi-
cult to implement directly through legislation. Nonbinding guide-
lines, however, are constitutional, and may be used to encourage
judges to set sentences along modal retributivist lines.112
V. QUALIFICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
A few closing qualifications and considerations are in order.
First, this article has not attempted to defend from the ground
up either retributivism or the intuition that resultant harm mat-
ters for punishment. These sentiments have wide appeal and
have been examined by others. Nor has modal retributivism been
advanced as the exclusive determinant of punishment. For ex-
ample, remorse of the offender, forgiveness of the victim, mercy
of the authority establishing the norm transgressed, or conflict-
ing principles of justice, may properly bear upon punishment."''
The last twenty years have seen a flourishing of intriguing non-
retributive punishment theories, such as expressivism, atone-
ment, and restorative, Aristotelean, communicative, and victim
vindication theories.114 These theories might be incorporated into
111. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (holding mandatory appli-
cation of federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 301-05 (2004) (holding that the jury's findings, and not additional findings by the
judge, constitute the allowable statutory maximum sentence a judge may impose under a
state sentening guidelines scheme); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490-92 (2000)
(holding that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statu-
tory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt," ex-
cepting the fact of a prior conviction).
112. See sources cited supra note 111; see also John E. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of
Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54
UCLA L. REV. 235 (2006) (presenting empirical evidence that Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, even though nonbinding, significantly influence sentencing decisions of federal
judges).
113. The author has argued principles of distributive justice are relevant in determin-
ing the punishment due to entrapped offenders. See Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Un-
lawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 827-31, 871-75 (2004).
114. See generally R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of
Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1996) (discussing the communicative theory of punish-
ment); Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1813 (1999)
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modal retributivism by providing the positive reason for punish-
ment in cases where modal retributivism merely licenses pu-
nishment. Alternatively, the punishment recommendation of
these theories might have to be balanced against those of modal
retributivism. Consequentialist considerations, for example, are
likely always to be included in the balance to some degree. I
know of no contemporary theorist who takes the position that a
person must be punished in accordance with his desert no matter
what the cost."5 Most, if pressed, I believe would agree that even
a person who culpably killed another without excuse or justifica-
tion need not be punished if the life of an innocent person could
thereby be saved without other cost to society. Likewise most, if
pressed, I believe would agree that even an innocent person
might be subjected to criminal sanctions if, for example, the lives
of one thousand people could directly and immediately be saved
by it.116 Accordingly, this article should be viewed as resting on
the relatively modest premise that retribution is properly a lead-
ing norm in our criminal justice system and presenting, in the
form of modal retributivism, the best retributivist theory.'"
Second, strictly speaking, modal retributivism is simply the
theory that the culpable causing of a harm provides a reason to
punish while culpable acting without causing harm provides
merely a license to punish. The punishment levels recommended
in the preceding discussion are not intrinsic features of modal re-
tributivism. They and modal retributivism are jointly motivated
(discussing the atonement theory of punishment and comparing it to other popular theo-
ries, including restorativism); Huigens, supra note 91 (arguing in support of the aretaic
theory of punishment, which has its roots in Aristotelian ethics).
115. Certain passages of Kant suggest that he thought that wrongdoers must be pu-
nished. According to Kant:
The law of punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who
crawls through the windings of eudaemonism in order to discover something
that releases the criminal from punishment or even reduces its amount by
the advantage it promises, in accordance with the pharisaical saying, "It is
better for one man to die than for an entire people to perish." For if justice
goes, there is no longer any value in human beings' living on the earth.
KANT, supra note 33, at 105. Compare Bedau, supra note 1, at 58 (describing as "fanatic" a
person who ignores all costs of implementing retributivism), with Robinson, supra note
65, at 36-39 (1989) (providing a useful contemporary discussion of the trade-off between
desert and utility).
116. MOORE, supra note 6, at 719-24. The view that deontological stricture make be
overridden by extreme consequentialist concerns is called threshold deontology. See
Moore, supra note 16, at 41 (summarizing literature on topic).
117. Others have advocated a similar position. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note
5, at 7-10 (defending "moderate" retributivism).
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by the desideratum that moral truths be principled and nonarbi-
trary. But modal retributivism can be accepted even if these pu-
nishment levels are rejected.
Third, even if retributivism or the equality principle is re-
jected, modal retributivism may be relevant. A wide range of
nonconsequentialist theories take harm to be at least a factor
among those relevant to determining punishment. For example,
a theory might recommend that where a harm is intentionally
caused, the offender deserves a sanction of sufficient severity to
communicate to the offender the wrongness of his conduct."18
With respect to actors who intentionally cause harm H, the ne-
cessary punishment might not be equal to H, but be a function of
H, among other variables. With such theories, the issue will al-
ways arise: What is the appropriate amount of punishment in
cases where (a) H was intended but not caused, and (b) H was
merely risked but not caused? As with harm-based retributivism,
making punishment a function of H in these cases, despite the
fact that H was merely intended or risked, would be inconsistent
with the intuition that harm matters, and making punishment a
function of R x H, or some other fraction of H, instead of H, would
be problematic for the reasons given in Part II.c. The solution to
this difficulty would be to make the sanction a function of H, or R
x H, respectively, changing the mode of punishment from preca-
tory to permissive. So, for example, under the theory that the
purpose of punishment is to communicate to the wrongdoer the
nature of her wrongdoing, the difference between wrongful acts
that cause harm and those that do not could be reflected by the
different mode of the sanction. The offender, who obviously must
be given some information about why she is to be subjected to
harsh treatment, could be informed it was either because of the
harms she culpably caused, or her intent to cause harm plus
some consequentialist justification, depending on whether harm
was caused. This change in mode of punishment would communi-
cate the significance of wrong done."9 Likewise, according to a
theory in which the purpose of punishment is to assert the moral
118. See DUFF, supra note 4, at 351-53.
119. As a general matter, Duff, a proponent of the communicative theory of punish-
ment, provides little guidance regarding levels of punishment. In his book on the law of
attempts, he merely recommends that attempts receive a lighter sentence than the con-
summate offense correlate. Id. at 398.
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value of the victim in the face of its denial by the wrongdoer,'20
where there has been no harm to the victim, and where there has
been no mastery to refutel 2 '-the license to use the offender for
the good of society may sufficiently reaffirm the value of the
would-be victim. Accordingly, the approach of modal retributiv-
ism may be relevant to a wide range of nonconsequentialist theo-
ries of punishment.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article began with the widely held intuition that when it
comes to punishment, results matter. It then posed the imme-
diately obvious, but rarely asked, question, "How much do results
matter?" In investigating this question, the article assumed that
the principles of justice, be they compensatory, distributive, or
retributivist, did not contain arbitrary constants or elements. A
number of possible approaches to the problem were surveyed and
found wanting on the ground they could not generate plausible,
nonarbitrary penalty recommendations. Extended consideration
was then given to the idea that where a person acts culpably, but
there is no harm caused, the amount of punishment deserved
should be calculated based on harm risked. The idea of punishing
based on risk, however, was shown to be flawed because it could
not be extended to a range of offenses, such as reckless endan-
germent, while remaining faithful to the intuition that results
matter.
In light of these difficulties, modal retributivism was ad-
vanced. According to it, the fact that harm results from wrongful
conduct is not relevant to the harshness of the sanction deserved,
as it is under traditional harm-based retributivism, but rather, it
is relevant to the sanction's mode as precatory ("should be im-
posed") or permissive ("may be imposed"). Allowing harm to de-
termine the mode of punishment, rather than the amount, per-
mitted harm to play a principled role in determining punishment,
as well as offering a reasonable compromise between the claims
of positive and negative retributivism. Finally, going beyond
120. See HAMPTON, supra note 21, at 130 ("[The retributive motive for inflicting suffer-
ing is to annul or counter the appearance of the wrongdoer's superiority and thus affirm
the victim's real value.").
121. Hampton explains that where there is punishment, "I [the victim] master the
purported master, showing that he is my peer." Id. at 125.
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modal retributivism, this article sketched a principled approach
to punishment for crimes of passion, as well as rejected punish-
ment for crimes of negligence on the ground that a principled ap-
proach to them was not possible.
Even on the assumption that there are moral truths and prin-
ciples of justice, establishing their content is no easy matter.
Emotions and intuitions are our primary guides. But where emo-
tions and intuitions are weak, ambiguous, vague, or indetermi-
nate, reason can play a significant role in showing the way to
moral truth, or at the very least, can develop and delimit a range
of potential theories of justice that then might be evaluated for
moral appeal. By introducing modal retributivism and highlight-
ing its merits, this article hopefully has proven useful in this re-
gard.
